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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Plaintiff,

Case No. 20050005

v.

(incarcerated)

MARTY JOE GALVAN,
Appellant/Defendant.

OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is the opening brief of appellant in an appeal from
convictions for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-404, and assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, entered in the Third District Court of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy,
Judge, presiding.
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Utah Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20050005

Appellee/Plaintiff,

(incarcerated)

v.
MARTY JOE GAL VAN,
Appellant/Defendant.

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal
from third degree felony and class A misdemeanor convictions entered in a court of
record.
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Does the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement require resentencing before
a new judge?
This issue was raised in the trial court (R. 84-1114, R. 146 at 26).
This Court will be addressing this issue as a matter of law, without deference to
the trial court. See, e ^ , State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-76 (Utah 1988)
(remanding to the trial court to assess whether prosecutor's promise in plea bargain was
illusory and required withdrawal of the plea without any apparent deference to the trial
court).
2. Did the trial court have jurisdiction to rule on the 22(e) motion?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This issue was raised in the trial court (R. 140).
Jurisdictional issues pose questions of law, to be addressed without deference to
the trial court. See, e ^ , Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, ^ 10, 44 P.3d 724.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES
Pertinent constitutional provisions and rules are copied in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Mr. Galvan with one count of second degree felony robbery and
one count of third degree felony attempted theft (R. 2-3). Michael A. Peterson of LDA
represented Galvan (R. 42). Galvan waived his preliminary hearing (R. 47).
The State filed an amended information charging Galvan with third degree felony
theft and class a misdemeanor assault (R. 53-54). Galvan entered no contest pleas to the
amended charges on the condition detailed in the written plea form as follows:
At sentencing, the state recommends jail time on the Class A with
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the
end of successful probation, the state does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction.
(R. 56-62).

At the plea hearing, counsel clarified:

Mr. Sheffield [the prosecutor] will also recommend at the time of
sentencing probation in this case, with some jail time, and a release to an
intensive inpatient program.
(R. 146 at 11).
Judge Kennedy sentenced Galvan to consecutive terms of zero to five years in
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prison and one year in jail (R. 68-70).
Counsel moved for a restitution hearing and filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 71,
76).
Present counsel was appointed to represent Galvan (R. 78).
Galvan moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) because
the prosecutor had breached the plea agreement (R. 84-114).
Prior to the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate, Galvan wrote to Judge
Kennedy asking him to recuse himself for various reasons, including his failure to
intervene when the victim of the assault was threatening Galvan at sentencing (R. 124).
At the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate, present counsel asked Judge
Kennedy to continue the matter until a transcript of the prior proceedings in the case
could be prepared and reviewed (R. 125). The court agreed and continued the hearing (R.
125).
That same day, the court held a conference call with counsel for both parties and
struck the hearing on restitution and the motion to vacate (R. 127). The final order
regarding the conference call reflects that after setting the hearing, the court realized that
LDA had filed a notice of appeal (R. 140). The court was concerned that this deprived
him of jurisdiction (R. 140). Counsel for both parties stated their beliefs that the court did
have jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 22(e) motion to vacate, and offered to research the
matter for the court (R. 140). The court ruled that he did not have jurisdiction over the
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22(e) motion, and would defer ruling on the restitution motion, despite having jurisdiction
to address it while the matter was on appeal (R. 140).
Judge Henriod signed the final order (R. 140), and counsel filed a timely notice of
appeal (R. 142).
Galvan moved this Court to consolidate his two appeals, and this Court granted the
motion (R. 144).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Galvan entered no contest pleas to the amended charges on the condition detailed
in the written plea form as follows:
At sentencing, the state recommends jail time on the Class A with
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the
end of successful probation, the state does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction.
(R. 56-62).

At the plea hearing, counsel clarified:

Mr. Sheffield [the prosecutor] will also recommend at the time of
sentencing probation in this case, with some jail time, and a release to an
intensive inpatient program.
(R. 146 at 11).
At sentencing, after trial counsel identified the in-patient treatment facilities
willing to accept Mr. Galvan, and after the victim spoke, the prosecutor, Paul Parker,
stated:
I just noticed from the pre-sentence report, your Honor, some things that are
troubling. First of all, of course, is his history. It is long and extensive, and
it is very troubling for violence, the type of things that the defendant says
today, that it was just, you know, related to the alcohol.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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But yet it is replete back from the early days in the mid 1980s - or,
1982, with assaulting type offenses, and it runs the gamut up to the felony,
which was an aggravated assault, apparently with a weapon. He has just
done this almost all of his adult life, and this is - this is very concerning,
particularly given the facts and the circumstances we have in this case.
Secondly, I am concerned with his ability to really do well on a
probation setting. I notice on the page that describes the probation history
he has not done well. He has had some difficulties. He has not complied,
and they've had to bring him back. I notice even under the criminal history,
where it talks about the jail disciplinaries, that he was remanded for
inciting, agitating other prisoners, using threatening and abusive language.
Again, these are not wonderful indications of an individual that
should be on probation, and it looks to me like he needs to be in prison, as
the pre-sentence report has indicated. We'll submit it, your Honor.
(R. 146 at 23-24).
After Mr. Galvan pled for leniency with the court, trial counsel for Galvan
approached for an unrecorded bench conference (R. 146 at 26). Following this, trial
counsel noted that the prosecutor, Paul Parker, had breached the plea agreement reached
between trial counsel and another prosecutor, Kelly Sheffield, after Mr. Sheffield had
failed to leave a note for Mr. Parker informing him of the plea agreement (R. 146 at 26).
Mr. Parker interjected to explain that the plea agreement was not in his file, and
that "to stable that agreement," he would withdraw his comments and "make an
affirmative recommendation of probation." (R. 146 at 27).
The court indicated that regardless of the recommendations and regardless of what
the victim said, on the basis of Mr. Galvan's history involving prior abusive conduct, the
court would sentence him to consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison and one year
in jail (R. 146 at 28).
5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement entitles Mr. Galvan to specific
performance of the plea agreement in front of a new sentencing judge.
The trial court had jurisdiction to so rule, despite the filing of the first notice of
appeal.
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court, with an order that the case
be re-assigned for resentencing in compliance with the plea agreement.
ARGUMENTS
I.
MR. GALVAN IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN.
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court recognized that when a
guilty plea rests to a material degree upon the promise of a prosecutor, due process
requires that the prosecutor fulfill his or her promise. See id. at 262.l The Court left to
the discretion of the state courts the decision of whether a prosecutor's breach of a plea
agreement should result in the withdrawal of the plea or specific performance of the
promised recommendation in a resentencing before a different judge. Id. at 263.
Utah law has long recognized that when a defendant misunderstands the value of
the inducement which leads him to enter his guilty plea, this renders the benefit of the

*Due process of law is guaranteed by Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plea bargain illusory and entitles him to withdraw his plea. See, e.g., State v. Cope land,
765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 (Utah 1988) (court remanded to determine whether guilty pleas
were induced by sentencing recommendation that was legally impossible to come to
fruition, because if defendant misunderstood the value or the recommendation which
induced him to enter the pleas, the illusory nature of the prosecutor's promise justified
withdrawal of the plea).
As a matter of policy, most courts require prosecutors to comply with both the
letter and spirit of their agreements, because integrity should be expected of the
prosecution in all circumstances, and reliability of the prosecution is essential to the
continuing functioning of the very important plea bargaining process. See, e.g., United
States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, these courts require the
prosecutors to comply with both the letter and spirit of their agreements, and will find a
breach of agreements when prosecutors technically comply with their obligations while
making "thinly veiled" or very subtle efforts to persuade a court in a fashion inconsistent
with the prosecutors' obligations under the agreements. See id. at 1211-1213.
The lengthy prison recommendation delivered by Mr. Parker in this case, followed
by his perfunctory attempt to comply with the letter of the plea agreement, was no
substitute for delivering the true inducement which led Mr. Galvan to enter his plea, and
entitles him to withdraw his plea. Cf. Copeland, supra.
Because the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement nullified the inducement

7
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which led Galvan to enter the pleas and rendered Galvan's guilty pleas unknowing and
involuntary, this Court should remand this matter to a different sentencing judge so that
Galvan can receive the benefit of the plea bargain. See Santobello, supra.
This Court discussed Santobello and Brye and other pertinent authorities in this
area of the law, in the recent decision, State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203.
In SmiU the prosecutor agreed at the time of the plea agreement not to recommend
any jail time, but at the time of sentencing, recommended a jail sentence of three to six
months. Id. at ^ j 3 and 4. On appeal from the trial court's denial of the motion to
withdraw the plea, the Court first reviewed Santobello, and then surveyed Utah decisions
and decisions from other jurisdictions, which likewise grant trial courts discretion to
remedy prosecutorial breaches of plea agreements with withdrawal of pleas or specific
performance. Id. atfflf 10-17.
In SmiU the defendant did not seek specific performance in a resentencing before a
different judge, one of the two remedies authorized by Santobello. See Smit at f 35
(concurring opinion of Judge Thorne). Rather, he immediate sought specific performance
in the sentencing before the original judge who heard the prosecutor's initial unlawful
recommendation of a jail sentence. Id. When the prosecutor complied with the
defendant's demand by correcting the recommendation to comport with the plea
agreement and the judge imposed jail time, the defendant then moved to withdraw the
plea, and the trial court denied this motion, concluding that the sentencing decision was
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not influenced by the prosecutor's first unlawful recommendation, which was cured by
the prosecutor's corrected recommendation. See id. at ^f 35 (concurring opinion of Judge
Thorne) and 20-21 (main opinion).
The fact that a judge is not influenced by a prosecutor's illegal recommendation
does not mollify the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement, which breach destroys the
knowing and voluntary nature of the entry of guilty pleas. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at
262-63 (remanding for withdrawal of the plea or resentencing before a different judge,
despite the fact that the judge below found that he was not influenced by the prosecution);
Srnit, 2004 UT App 222 at ^f 13-15 (discussing Utah cases recognizing that if defendant
enters guilty plea contingent on the promise of the prosecution which is not or cannot be
fulfilled, this renders the plea unknowing and involuntary).
Smit should be read very narrowly and limited to its holding, that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the unique
facts of that case. For if prosecutors were given carte blanche to make and then retract
recommendations inconsistent with their obligations under plea agreements, this would
undermine the integrity of their very important governmental office, and the reliability
and advisability of utilizing the plea bargaining process. Cf., e.g., Brye, supra. It would
also undermine the value of the plea bargains and negate their validity by rendering the
inducements illusory. Cf, e.g., Copeland, supra.
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court and order that Mr. Galvan

9
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be resentenced before a new sentencing court. See Santobello, supra.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO RULE ON THE 22(e) MOTION.
The trial court was in error in ruling that he had no jurisdiction to rule on the Rule
22(e) motion by virtue of the filing of the notice of appeal. Under the plain terms of Utah
R. Crim. P. 22(e), a trial court "may correct... a sentence imposed in an illegal manner ...
at any time."

Cf. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87-88 (Utah 1991) (trial courts are

viewed as having continuing jurisdiction to correct void sentences).
Thus, the general rule that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of
jurisdiction does not apply in this context. Cf State v. Sampson, 806 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah
App. 1991) (because rule and statute pertaining to certificates of probable cause specifies
that petitions for certificates are to be filed with the trial courts, the general rule that the
filing of the notice of appeal divests a trial court of jurisdiction does not apply).
CONCLUSION
This Court should remand this to the trial court for resentencing in compliance
with the plea agreement before a new judge.
Respectfully submitted on June 6, 2005.

Elizabeth?
Counsel for Mr. Galvan
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on June 6, 2005,1 mailed two true and correct copies of the
foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULE
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Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter
bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant
may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence
and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if
any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the
defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting
forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a
true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the
commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TRIAL COURT RULING

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

HLIS DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Elizabeth Hunt L.L.C.
Elizabeth Hunt (5292)
Attorney for Mr. Galvan
569 Browning Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801)461-4300
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SALT LAKE CPUNTY.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
EST AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

ORDER REGARDING
JURISDICTION

v.

CaseNo.0041904272FS

MARTY JOE GALVAN,

Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendant/Appellant.

On January 24, 2005, this matter came on for hearing regarding restitution and Mr.
Galvan's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Mr, Galvan
was present with his counsel, Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Kelly R.
Sheffield.
Because Mr. Galvan had written a letter to the Court seeking recusal, this Court set
the matter for further hearing on March 7, 2005 at 10:00 a.m., in order to give Ms. Hunt
an opportunity to review the record and to file whatever pleadings she felt were in order
on the recusal issue.
After the hearing, the Court realized that a notice of appeal had been filed on Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Clerk

Galvan's behalf, and the Court's clerk initiated a conference call with counsel for the
parties because the Court was concerned that the notice of appeal may have deprived the
Court of jurisdiction.
During the conference call, Ms. Hunt indicated her belief that the Court did have
continuing jurisdiction over the restitution matter and the Rule 22 motion to vacate, and
offered to brief the jurisdictional issue for the Court. Mr. Sheffield indicated his belief
that the Court did have continuing jurisdiction over the restitution matter, and indicated
that he would have a clerk research the Court's jurisdiction over the Rule 22 motion to
vacate.
The Court concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction over the Rule 22
motion, and that, while it does have continuing jurisdiction over the restitution issue, the
Court would defer hearing the restitution issues until the appeal is complete.
Accordingly, the hearing of March 7, 2005 is stricken.
So ordered this ^ } \ day ofm

THE HONORABLE JOE^[ m U L
JUDGE OF THE THIRD

approved as to fo;
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I hereby certify that on January 24,2005,1 mailed, e-mailed and faxed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to Kelly R. Sheffield, Deputy District Attorney, 111 East
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 8,
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